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Abstract: Predestination, as a metaphysical issue, carries the idea of prenatal choice or ascription
of the purpose or end to which any person or thing is created. Destiny as chosen or ascribed to
a person represents what the person has to unwind in the world. In Yoruba account of
predestination, a moulded body, already infused with the spirit of life by Olodumare (the
supreme being), goes to pick an Ori (the bearer of destiny). Sometimes, such a destiny is
considered imposed on the self. The destiny, so chosen or so ascribed or imposed, encapsulates
the successes and failures which the human being is meant to unravel during his or her course
of existence in this world. Considering some arguments on personal identity, the paper obser-
ves that a case of identity cannot be established between the person who chose a destiny in
heaven and the one who is assumed to be unraveling it in the world. Given the fact that the
relationship of identity cannot be established between the two entities, the paper concludes
that the notion of predestination, with special focus on the Yoruba account, cannot stand
rational scrutiny.
Keywords: predestination, destiny, human person, personal identity, supreme being, bearer of
destiny.
INTRODUCTION
Predestination, as a metaphysical issue, carries the idea of prenatal choice
or ascription of the purpose or end to which any person or thing is created.
Destiny as chosen by or ascribed to a person represents what the person has to
212
Predestination and the metaphysics of identity: a Yoruba (African) case study
1 See ABIMBOLA, Wande. La notion de personne en Afrique Noire. Colloques Internationale du
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unwind in this world. In Yoruba account of predestination, a moulded body,
already infused with the spirit of life by Olodumare, goes to pick an Ori (the
bearer of destiny). Sometimes, such a destiny or Ori is considered imposed on
the self. The destiny, so chosen or so ascribed or imposed, encapsulates the
successes and failures which the human being is meant to unravel during his or
her course of existence in this world.
The question may be raised concerning the identity of the being who
chose a destiny or upon whom a destiny was imposed in heaven, and the hu-
man being, on earth, who is expected to manifest or actualize the destiny. Un-
less the relationship of identity can be established between the two entities, it
may be difficult, if at all, to talk of predestination.
Given some arguments on personal identity, it seems problematic to es-
tablish the position that a specific human being was prenatally destined to do
some things and not others while on earth. The interest of this paper is to
examine the tenability or otherwise of predestination within the metaphysical
question of personal identity.
YORUBA ACCOUNT OF PREDESTINATION
In the Yoruba conception of human person1, a human person is made of
Ara (body), Emi (soul), and Ori (the inner head). This Ori, the inner head,
is the bearer of destiny. This account of human person emphasizes the impor-
tance of Ori and by implication, makes destiny or predestination a necessary
component of a human person.
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Yoruba generally refer to Ori as the unconscious self, as inner head, as
one’s guardian spirit, and as the bearer of destiny. According to Gbadegesin,
“(…) it is the Ori that selects the destiny of the person before Olodumare (the
Supreme deity) who normally endorses such a choice”.2 Another account of
Yoruba concept of Ori is given by Idowu, who claims that Yoruba regard Ori
as the personality Spirit. For Idowu, Ori “is the very essence of personality
(…) it is this Ori that rules, controls, and guides the ‘life’ and activities of the
person”.3
The question, however, is about the status of Ori vis-à-vis other causal
agents. Can we regard Ori as the antecedent cause of all other possible causes?
In other words, do we see other causes as mere causal manifestations of one
underlying cause – Ori? If the answer is yes, then we can correctly argue that
there is a connection between the Yoruba concept of Ori and destiny. This
takes us to the other Yoruba related notions of Ipin (that which is allocated
to someone), Ayanmo (that which is affixed to someone), and Akunleyan
(that which is chosen kneeling). All of these concepts convey the idea of
destiny which, if critically examined, could be seen to convey some impor-
tant differences. For Idowu, “(…) we have a trimophous conception of
destiny.”4
Going by these related terms, a little clarification may be warranted. For
instance, ayanmo and ipin imply something that was imposed on human per-
sons, without any enquiry on whether they wanted it or not. Ayanmo and ipin
are predominantly suggestive of the influence of an external factor against which
we are powerless. Consequently, one may, it seems to me, argue that what
becomes one’s destiny is not within one’s ability to choose. Given this account,
the action one finds oneself performing here on earth, is independent of one’s
choice or wishes. The account renders human beings as mere toys in the hands
of the gods. On the other hand, akunleyan is suggestive of one’s conscious
choice, most probably, without any external compulsion. Whichever way, the
person comes into the world with his destiny doubly sealed, and whatever a
2 GBADEGESIN, Olusegun, ibid., p. 175.
3 IDOWU, Bolaji. Olodumare: God in Yoruba belief. London: Longman,1962, p. 170 and 180.
4 Ibid., p. 183. For more on this, see MORAKINYO, Olufemi. The Ayanmo myth and mental health care
in West Africa. Journal of Culture and Ideas, 1: 68-73, 1983.
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person does achieve, or whatever happens to him, is a precise working out of
his destiny. 5
The upshot of this is that in Yoruba universe, each human being is pre-
destined to lead a kind of life and not others. That is, each human being while
in isalu orun (heaven), chose or found affixed on him or her, a particular kind
of destiny which he or she is expected to actualise, unravel, or manifest in this
world. On this account, destiny represents the kind of choice or affixation in
isalu orun which will invariably determine the earthly success or failure. It is
believed that the choice or affixation of a good Ori ensures that the individual
concerned would lead a successful and prosperous life on earth, while the choice
or affixation of a bad Ori condemns the individual concerned to a life of failure.6
THE YORUBA ACCOUNT OF PREDESTINATION AND PROBLEM OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
‘Personal identity’ invokes a relation between a person who is known to
exist at one time, and a person who is known to have existed at another time.7
Identity in this sense presupposes “an uninterrupted continuance of existence”.8
The reasoning here according to Reid, is that; that which has ceased to exist
cannot be the same with that which afterward begins to exist; for this would be
to suppose a being to exist after it ceased to exist, and to have had existence
before it was produced.9
If examined in view of the problem of personal identity, questions can be
raised about the authenticity and validity of beliefs in predestination. It will
interest philosophers to know whether the figure which picked a destiny or on
whom a destiny was affixed at isalu orun is the same person as, or, identical to,
5 See IDOWU, Bolaji, p. 194, and SALAMI, Yunusa Kehinde. Predestination, freedom, and responsibility:
a case in Yoruba moral philosophy. Research in Yoruba Language and Literatures, 7: 6, 1996.
6 ABIMBOLA, Wande. Ifa: an exposition of Ifa literary corpus. Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1976, p.
113.
7 See LOCKE, John. Of identity and diversity. In: WOOZLEY A.D. (ed.). Essay concerning human
understanding. London: Fontana Library, 1964, QUINTON, Anthony. The Soul. The Journal of Philosophy,
59, n. 15, 1962; PERRY, John (ed.). Personal identity. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975.
8 REID, Thomas. Of the nature and origin of our notion of personal identity. In: EDWARDS, Paul and
PAP, Arthur (eds.). A modern introduction to philosophy: readings from classical and contemporary sources.
New York: The Free Press, 1973, p. 195.
9 REID, Thomas, ibid.
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the human being who is in this world unraveling the earlier chosen or affixed
destiny. Can a case of uninterrupted continual existence be established?
The issue here is that unless there is an identity between the body which
chose a destiny, or on which a destiny was affixed, and the person whose life
manifests the destiny, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to talk of predestina-
tion and the later unraveling of such a destiny. My point is that if there is
actually no identity or sameness, the talk of destiny or predestination becomes
otiose. This takes us to the discussion on what the idea of personal identity
entails. In other words, what properties or qualities should be obtained in or-
der to establish personal identity?
Philosophers have variously attempted to tackle the problem of personal
identity. The problem of personal identity, like all other metaphysical problems,
has almost been intractable. While most philosophers tend to agree that personal
identity involves an uninterrupted continual existence, they differ on what it is
that uninterruptedly continues to exist. What each philosopher takes as the sub-
ject of uninterrupted continual existence depends largely on his or her general
metaphysical standpoint on the question of the ultimate constituent of personhood.
While for some, mind or soul (mental event), is the essential component
of a person, some others argue that body or the physical is the essential constitu-
ent of personhood. The third possibility is to talk of person as person. This third
position argues that a person is a whole entity, an indivisible whole. This means
that a person cannot be divided into body on one part and mind on the other.
For those who consider mind, soul, or the mental aspect as the essential
element of a person, personal identity requires sameness of consciousness, re-
membrance or memory. While a variant of this version strictly maintains that
sameness of consciousness is all that is required for personal identity, some
other variant argues that sameness of consciousness must be conjoined to
sameness of body in order to allow for talk of personal identity.
For the strict memory thesis, personal identity holds and different per-
son-stages belong to the same person if and only if the later could contain an
experience which is a memory of a reflective awareness of an experience con-
tained in the earlier.10 For John Locke, for instance;
10 See LOCKE, op. cit.; QUINTON, op. cit., p. 3-98.
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(…) since consciousness always accompanies thinking and it is that which
makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself
from all other thinking things: in this alone consists personal identity, i.e.; the
sameness of a rational being; and as far as this consciousness can be extended
backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that
person (…).11
In this passage, Locke makes reflective consciousness the basis for per-
sonal identity. By reflective consciousness, Locke meant the conscious act of
introspection through which a person critically looks inward and reflect on his
or her experiences. For Locke, a person who, through introspection, is able to
link the series of experiences at the different levels of his person-stages is iden-
tical to the person of the different person-stages.
A Quintonian reformulation of Locke’s memory thesis can be read to
mean that there is a sequence of person-stages(not necessarily in the order they
occur in time and not excluding repetitions), the first of which is A and the last
of which is B, such that each person-stage in the sequence either(i) contains or
could contain a memory of an experience contained in the next or (ii) contains
an experience of which the next person-stage contains a memory, or could
contain a memory.12
In spite of the criticisms against this thesis on personal identity, the em-
phasis is on the continuance in the memory chain of experiences attributable to
same individual. As this argument goes, personal identity arises when a person
at a point in time can link his or her present experience to a whole sequence of
past memory chains.
One problem is that not all philosophers would base personal identity
on sameness of memory or consciousness. Some maintains that sameness of
consciousness must be conjoined to sameness of body in order to have per-
sonal identity. For the proponents of this second view, sameness of conscious-
ness and bodily identity are both important criteria to personal identity. Thus,
the argument goes, neither of both can be regarded as the sole criterion of
personal identity. It is in line with this view that Sydney Shoemaker main-
tains that:
11 LOCKE, op. cit., p. 39-40.
12 PERRY, op. cit., p. 19.
África: Revista do Centro de Estudos Africanos. USP, S. Paulo, 24-25-26: 211-223, 2002/2003/2004/2005
217
(…) whether or not memory is a criterion of personal identity, it is not the
criterion… it cannot be the sole criterion that we use in making identity
statements about other persons (…) Bodily identity is certainly a criterion of
personal identity…But I do not think that it can be the sole criterion (…).13
While these two positions emphasise sameness of consciousness and
or bodily identity, there is another position that emphasises the necessary
presence of some underlying substances for personal identity to obtain. Yet,
some other scholars consider the talk of personal identity a mis-direction of
energy.14
These positions are quite relevant to our discussion of predestination
and personal identity. The issue to be examined is whether the chooser or the
one who picked the ori in Isalu-orun (heaven) is identical to the one who is
supposed to be unraveling the destiny here in Isalu-aye (earthly world). The
point we may want to push is that if personal identity between the one who
picked an ori in heaven and the person meant to unravel what the ori portends
here on earth is illusory, then, the problem easily dissolves because there would
not be any talk of identity between the two different personalities.
Looking at the position emphasizing the significance of an underlying
substance in the determination of personal identity, there is the problem of
determining what the substance (that which I know not what)15 is, or can be
taken to mean. If we grant the existence of the substance, there is the problem
of how to identify it. Greater still is the problem of using what cannot be iden-
tified as the link between one person-stage and the other.
To serve as a criterion for personal identity, the criterion itself must be
identifiable. Since substance is something unknowable, or at least, something
‘I know not what’, it cannot be the basis for an empirical question of personal
identity. After all, unless we know what the substance is, we would not know
whether the different person-stages share the same substance or not. Since
sameness must be sameness of something, it stands to reason that the sameness
13 SHOEMAKER, op. cit., p. 124-129.
14 See BUTLER, Joseph. Of personal identity. In: PERRY, op. cit., p. 99-105, and HUME, David, In:
PERRY, op. cit., p. 161-172.
15 LOCKE, John. An essay concerning human understanding. London: Fontana Library, 1964, p. 185-
187. (ed.: A. D. Woozley).
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of something ‘I know not what’ cannot be determined, and so unhelpful in the
resolution of the problem of personal identity.
Given the problem associated with the use of substance as criterion for
personal identity, efforts should be concentrated on more empirical criteria.
If we talk of sameness of body as a criterion of identity between the one
who picked an ori in heaven and the person who is assumed to be unraveling it
here on earth, there will be a serious problem. For instance at the time when an
individual being chose an ori, the individual was in the world of spirit. The
individual was at then, a spiritual being, yet to come to the world of matter.
Consequently, talk of bodily identity between the chooser and the one who
unravels the destiny does not arise.
This shifts the discussion to the realm of consciousness. The question
now is whether an identity can be established using the criterion of sameness of
consciousness. For those who adopt the consciousness as the basis of personal
identity, the emphasis is on the capacity to reflectively connect our memory-
phases. In other words, personal identity is established between persons P1
and P2 at different times t1 and t2 if P2 at t2 can reflectively call to memory, the
experiences of P1 at t1. This, for the consciousness theorists,
16 is the basis for
establishing personal identity.
The question now is, ‘can the human person, here on earth, whose re-
sponsibility it is to unravel the destiny chosen or ascribed in heaven, reflectively
connect the memory-phases of the experience of ever choosing a particular kind
of Ori or destiny? The point here is that unless the person on earth, who is
meant to unravel the destiny earlier chosen, can be rationally conscious of or
recall, the memory of the experience of choosing a particular kind of Ori in
heaven, there would be no justifiable ground to talk of someone having chosen
one destiny or the other in heaven. After all, to talk of a destiny belonging to a
particular person is to presuppose that the person to unravel a destiny and the
chooser of the destiny both refer to one and the same individual.
If we go by the position that rests personal identity on consciousness or
memory, there is bound to be an initial problem. The initial problem is that it
16 LOCKE, op. cit., p. 33-52; QUINTON, op. cit., p. 53-72, GRICE, H.P. Personal Identity. In: PERRY, op.
cit., p. 73-98.
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is already contained in the Yoruba account of predestination that the chooser of
destiny in isalu orun (heaven) passed through or crossed the river of forgetful-
ness while coming to ode isalaye (the human world) and so cannot remember
or have a reflective memory of having ever picked an Ori.
The question is how to link a destiny to a man who never remembered
anything in connection with the destiny or the fact of choosing it. If the destiny
and its choice are to be of principal relevance to the life of a person, that person
must be able to link himself or his life to the destiny and its choice.
One possible way of linking the person with his chosen destiny can be
traced in a version of Yoruba cosmology according to which Ifa oracle was
present when individuals were choosing Ori.17 Based on the supposed pres-
ence of Ifa oracle, it is believed that Ifa divination can help to reveal the sort
of Ori which was chosen and, perhaps, what can be done to change a bad
one for good.
The argument is that if we grant the authenticity of Ifa as a plausible
means to the knowledge of the transcendent, then, we are likely to acknowledge
the possibility of linking a person to his destiny through the revelatory knowl-
edge of Ifa oracle. Given this account, it is assumed that anyone who wishes to
have his destiny revealed to him would simply seek the assistance of Ifa oracle
and its priest.
One problem with this approach is that it does not help the individual
concerned to reflectively recollect a forgotten experience. Rather, it seems to
merely impose a piece of information on an individual. The imposed piece or
pieces of information cannot be correctly taken to be a coherent part of a cohe-
sive memory chain. The information from Ifa oracle is extraneous to, and does
not form a system with the past and present memory-phases of the individual
concerned.
Apart from the problem associated with merely mentioning an occur-
rence true or an integral part of the individual’s psychological system, there is
also the problem of inter-subjective verifiability. The modus operandi of Ifa as
a source of knowledge is not open to the scientific methodology of verifica-
17 MAKINDE, M. Akin. Ifa as a repository of knowledge. in The proceedings of the 17th World Congress
of Philosophy, Montreal, 1983, and MAKINDE, M. Akin. The Yoruba concepts of Ori and human destiny.
Journal of International Studies in Philosophy, p. 57, 1985.
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tion.18 It does not allow cross-checking of facts. In fact, two Ifa priests may
differ or disagree on what destiny belongs to a particular individual.
In case of any disagreement among Ifa priests or among Ifa priests and
other people, there is the problem of finding a final arbiter whose opinion is
respected as the final expression of what the destiny of an individual is. The
upshot is that the prediction by the Ifa priest is not often based on any repeat-
able and ratiocinative process. This traditional account seems not scientifically
demonstrable. There is little likelihood, if any, for Ifa to provide the supposed
missing link in the memory-phases of a person P1 at t1 who picked an Ori, and
by extension, destiny, and, the person P2 at t2 who unravels the destiny as
encapsulated by the chosen Ori.
A Yoruba predestinationist may take succour in the Freudian psycho-
analytic theory. According to this theory, human consciousness is like an ice-
berg on the surface of an ocean. The part beneath the water surface is of
greater proportion than the one that is presented to human perception. In other
words, the unconscious and the forgotten part of human consciousness are
greater in proportion to the conscious part. Moreover, the unconscious libido,
to a very noticeable extent, constitutes the basis for human consciousness. Freud-
ian psycho- analysis like Plato’s account of knowledge in Meno19, suggests that
an individual would be able to recollect the forgotten part of his consciousness
with the aid of serious and methodical questioning.
The outcome of this is that it would be wrong to deny an individual of the
forgotten phase in his memory chain simply because he could no longer recollect
such a phase. Moreover, the theory suggests some steps toward recalling such a
phase. The question to be raised is whether this Freudian account can help to
bridge this missing gap in the Yoruba account of destiny and predestination.
18 While one may not be justified to claim that science can provide answers to all problems it still behooves
us to say that science has provided the most reliable source of knowledge about the world. In some sense, the
disagreement among Ifa Priests may be due to the limitations on the parts of the Priests.
19 See PLATO, Meno. In: JOWETT, B. (trans.) The dialogues of Plato. v. 11, London: Oxford University
Press, 1931; TAYLOR, A.E. Plato: the man and his work. Edinburgh: Methuen, 1969; BEDU-ADDO, J. T.
Sense–experience and recollection in Plato’s Meno. American Journal of Philology, 104: 228, 1983; BEDU-
ADDO, J.T. Recollection and the argument from a hypothesis’ in Plato’s Meno. Journal of Hellenic Studies,
IV: 1-14, 1984; GULLEY, N. Plato’s theory of knowledge. London: Methuen, 1962, p. 17-18; HAROLD,
zyskind and STERNFIELD, R. Plato’s Meno 89c: virtue is knowledge a hypothesis? Phronesis, XXI: 130-
34, 1976, and FREUD, Sigmund. Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. New York: W.W. Norton, 1966.
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20 There are various hints in Yoruba mythology about how human beings were made to forget all that they
previously knew in heaven when they passed through the river of forgetfulness just at the boundary between
heaven and earth. As the myth goes, once individuals have crossed this river, they are made to forget all they
had known earlier in heaven. There are a lot of similarities between this Yoruba account and the accounts of
several earlier Greek Philosophers including Plato.
21 GBADEGESIN, Olusegun. Destiny, personality and the ultimate reality of human existence: a Yoruba
perspective. Ultimate Reality and Meaning, 7(3): 173-188, 1984.
As interesting as the Freudian argument and the argument from Ifa may
seem, they both lack the required strength to solve this problem of destiny and
personal identity. It may be interesting to note, for instance, that Freudian
psychoanalytic theory does not represent the view of all psychologists. It is
difficult to imagine how Freudian psycho-analytic theory or Plato’s idea of
knowledge as recollection can help an individual to remember a choice of Ori
which he ought to have forgotten when crossing the river of forgetfulness before
coming to this world.20 It will require an infinite number of questioning for
someone to recollect experiences which, if ever existed, have been totally erased
from the memory chain. On this account, it seems a gratuitous assumption to
base a continuity of memory-phase solely on the Freudian psychoanalytic ac-
count or the account of possible revelation through Ifa divination.
From the foregoing, it can, to a large extent, be argued that an identity
cannot be established between the agent who chose an Ori, and the actual
human being who is expected to unravel the destiny which the Ori bears. There
is no case of physical continuity or memory sameness between the chooser and
the one who is assumed to be unraveling the choice. If this identity cannot be
established, it may not be rationally defensible to talk of predestination. After
all, for predestination to be meaningful there must be someone who is predes-
tined. The difficulty in establishing an identity between the person who chose
a destiny and the one who is expected to bear the consequences of the destiny
makes it difficult or impossible to rationally identify someone with his destiny;
and, consequently, to strongly effect any support for the idea of destiny and
predestination.
In spite of the fact that the idea of destiny and predestination portends
some social and moral benefits for the society and the individuals21, it turns out
to be one of the problems that are not easily resolved on the strength of rational
assessment.
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One cannot overlook the benefits derived from the idea of predestination
in the social and moral spheres of life. There is no doubt that the idea of choice
of Ori and the destiny it bears has enabled some traditional Yoruba indigenous
thinkers to take, with ease, the daily vicissitudes of life and to appreciate and
live with the differences in the structure of human existence. Whether or not
the choice of Ori is true or accepted to be true, the traditional Yoruba believes
that he chose an Ori, and also that this Ori is the bearer of his destiny. While
he works hard to realise his destiny, the idea relieves him of the agony of the
inequality in the society. The traditional Yoruba respects others and avoids
offending others around who may change a good Ori to a bad one.
Nevertheless, as desirable as the idea of predestination may seem, it
does not make predestination real if it is actually not real. Thus, no matter how
re-assuring our reasons for desiring predestination may be, it is most unlikely
that such reasons can rationally meet the rigorous criteria of personal identity.
CONCLUSION
The paper examines the metaphysical issues of destiny and predestina-
tion with special focus on the Yoruba notion of destiny and predestination
according to which everyone, while in heaven, picked an Ori, or found im-
posed on him, an Ori, which encapsulates the successes and failures which the
human being is meant to unravel during his course of existence in this world.
The paper notes the social and moral benefits of the notion of predesti-
nation in regulating the social and moral activities in Yoruba traditional cul-
ture. The paper observes that a case of identity cannot be established between
the person who chose a destiny in heaven and the one who is assumed to be
unraveling it in the human world. Given the fact that the relationship of iden-
tity cannot be established between the two entities, the paper concludes that
the notion of predestination, with special focus on the Yoruba account, cannot
stand rational scrutiny.
Resumo: A predestinação como uma questão da metafísica tem a ver com a idéia de uma
escolha ou uma atribuição pré-natal do objetivo ou da finalidade pela qual uma pessoa ou um
objeto foi criado. O destino como algo escolhido ou atribuído representa aquilo que a pessoa
deve cumprir ao longo da sua vida terrestre. Conforme alguns relatos iorubanos acerca da
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predestinação, após a infusão do fôlego da vida que Olodumare (o ente supremo) deposita em
cada pessoa criada, a pessoa tem que escolher o seu ori (destino) que o vai acompanhar ao
mundo. Outros relatos acreditam que esse destino é imposto à pessoa. Seja qual for a maneira
da aquisição, os iorubas acreditam que é dentro desse destino que se encontra impresso os
sucessos e fracassos que a pessoa vai ter que vivenciar durante toda a sua vida.
Baseado em alguns argumentos propostos sobre a identidade pessoal, este artigo observa que
não se pode estabelecer a priori uma relação de identidade entre aquela pessoa que escolheu
um destino numa existência pré-natal e aquele que, supostamente está cumprindo esse mesmo
destino no mundo físico. Devido a essa impossibilidade de provar que se trata nos dois casos
duma e mesma pessoa, o artigo conclui que a noção de predestinação proposta pelo código
iorubano não pode ser sustentado de um ponto de vista racional.
Palavras chave: predestinação, destino, pessoa humana, identidade pessoal, o ser supremo,
Ori – o portador do destino.
